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NeoWestern Business-Government Relations: The 
Case of Poland 
 
This article investigates the applicability of Western models of business-
government relations to the postcommunist context.  Given the absence of a 
business-government relationship over the forty years of communism, it seems 
perfectly plausible that postcommunist countries should produce a historically 
unprecedented form of business-government relations and a new type of 
capitalist democracy.  On the other hand, these countries have for several 
years been unequivocally regarded as capitalist democracies so it also seems 
possible that a literature developed for Western capitalist democracies should 
be useful in the postcommunist context.  This article argues that, in spite of 
their assertions to the contrary, postcommunist studies propose no new 
concepts or variables for the study of business-government relations.  
Moreover, a detailed case study of Poland demonstrates the applicability of 
Western models to a postcommunist context.  The confrontation between 
Western models and postcommunist data does not “stretch” the models but, in 
some important respects, actually clarifies them. 
 
The first wave of research on former communist states was defined by a hypothesis 
that has dominated political science over the last century: the hypothesis of the 
universality of democracy.  Some have argued that every corner of the globe can, or 
must, adopt this system, while others have asserted that it is possible in, and suitable 
for, only a small set of countries.  Capitalist democracy has been consolidated in East-
Central Europe in the sense that no significant group, domestically or externally, even 
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considers an alternative system.  The focus of the universality hypothesis is now 
moving south and east of this region.   The second wave of research on former 
communist states is defined by another hypothesis, which has dominated political 
science for some time: this is the hypothesis of the diversity of capitalist democracy. 
It is now widely accepted that what divides capitalist democracies from each other is 
as important as what they have in common (Lijphart).   Given the sharp divergence 
between the communist states and the capitalist democracies for over forty years, the 
former communist states make for an intriguing sample with which to investigate the 
global diversity of democracy.   
 
The issue of business-government relations is a particularly apposite one with 
which to test the diversity hypothesis in a former communist state.  This is because it 
relates so directly to the definition of a communist system and to one of the most 
fundamental challenges in the transformation of communist systems.  The fusion of 
politics and economics was perhaps the defining feature of communist systems.  One 
of the great themes of the transformation of communist systems since 1989 has been 
the separation of politics and economics.  Of course, completely separating the two is 
impossible.  It is more important to concentrate on the establishment of an efficient 
interface between politics and the economy.  Given the singularity of the “business-
government” relationship over the previous forty years, it seem perfectly plausible 
that postcommunist countries should produce a historically unprecedented form of 
business-government relations and a new type of capitalist democracy.  Indeed, many 
prominent scholars argue that the origins of these capitalist democracies make them 
fundamentally different to existing capitalist democracies (Eyal, Szelényi, and 
Townsley; Staniszkis; Stark and Bruzst).  On the other hand, these countries have for 
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several years been unequivocally regarded as capitalist democracies so it seems 
perfectly possible that a literature developed for capitalist democracies should be 
useful in the Polish context.  Indeed, in several areas of political science, Western 
models have been shown to be appropriate to the postcommunist context (Krok-
Paskowska; Szczerbiak).  Therefore, prima facie, it is not obvious whether the 
existing literature on business-government relations is appropriate or not.  In other 
words, it is an open question whether postcommunist capitalist democracies are 
neoWestern or nonWestern.  Both answers would represent an important theoretical 
finding for students of business-government relations in particular, and political 
science in general. 
 
This article argues that Western models of business-government relations are 
applicable to East-Central Europe.  As in any study of politics, a detailed 
understanding of context is needed, but no new models seem to be necessary.  This 
argument is made on a theoretical and an empirical level.  The theoretical section 
reviews Western models of business-government relations, as well as arguments for 
the uniqueness of postcommunist business-government relations.  Then, it is argued 
that the supposedly unique postcommunist variables are actually to be found in the 
Western literature.  A brief methodology section is followed by empirical sections, 
which show that the Western literature is useful in a classifying and explaining Polish 
business-government relations.  The confrontation between the specificities of the 
Polish case and the Western literature does not result in “conceptual stretching” 
(Sartori 1970).  Moreover, in some respects, it provides an opportunity to improve on 
existing formulations by making them more rigorous and more concrete.  
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CLASSIFYING BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 
Wyn Grant’s trio of association, company and party states is the only framework, 
which seriously aspires to a comprehensive account of business-government relations 
(Grant, 13-18).  Moreover, it emphasises the fact that large enterprises face a choice 
of different methods, and a choice of different combinations of methods, when they 
interact with the state and the political system.  This contrasts with a large volume of 
work that focuses exclusively on business associations (Schmitter 1981).  Since the 
1980s, a useful literature has emerged, which looks at how firms combine and choose 
between company and association-based strategies (Bennett; Coen; Martin; Martin 
and Swank; Wilson).  However, virtually no analyses have dealt with the combination 
and choice between company, association, and party options.  This is largely because 
the literature on choice is usually focused on the United Kingdom, United States and 
European Union, where the relevance of the party state seems to be limited.   
 
Grant’s classification of business-government relations is based on two simple 
questions.  Firstly, “Are government-business relations mediated or unmediated?”  If 
they are unmediated, the system of business-government relations is called a 
“company state”.  If relations are mediated, it is necessary to ask a second question, 
“whether the principal intermediary is a political party or a system of business 
associations?” (Grant, 13)  The answer to this question classifies systems as 
“association” or “party” states.  It is easy enough to distinguish the association state 
from the other two classifications.  If a contact between business and the state is made 
by a business association, then it is an indicator of the association state.  However, 
Grant underestimates the difficulty of distinguishing between the company and party 
states.  Essentially, he proposes no standard for deciding when the political contacts 
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of a firm constitute intermediation by a political party.  When firms do not avail of 
business associations, their contacts with the state can take direct and indirect forms.  
Indirect representation involves the hiring of law firms, professional government-
relations firms, or freelance lobbyists.  Direct representation consists of state 
ownership, a dedicated government-relations division, or the personal efforts of the 
firm’s senior personnel (Grant, 92, 130; Vogel, 279).  Any of these six forms of 
contacts could conceivably be interpreted as evidence of the company or the party 
state.  More information is needed to distinguish the company and party states. 
 
Table one suggests three dimensions of contacts between firms and parties.  Grant 
is, of course, aware of these different types of contacts, and the important differences 
between them, but he never systematically relates them to his general classification of 
business-government relations (Grant, Martinelli, and Patterson). 
 
TABLE 1 
Dimensions of contact between firms and political parties 
Relationship Political Diversity Time 
Individual politician One political party Less than the length of a standard parliament 
More than one politician Two or more (politically close) parties 
The length of one standard 
parliament 
Party faction Two or more (politically distant) parties 
More than the length of one 
standard parliament 
Party as a whole All substantial parties  
Funding a party   
Formal association with a party   
 
In this article, a party state will be defined as a situation in which a firm’s contacts 
with the state and politics usually take the form of a close relationship with more than 
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one politician, a faction of a party, or a whole party, or with groups of more than one 
politician, or factions, or the whole organisations, of two, or more, politically close 
parties, for at least the length of one standard parliament.  The close relationship may 
involve funding or formal association, but neither is necessary for party state 
classification.  All other contacts between an individual firm and the state or politics 
will be classified as company state behaviour.  Where a firm has close relationships 
only with single politicians from political parties the relationship can hardly be said to 
be with a party, and is therefore an indication of the company state.  Where 
relationships are with distant parties or with all substantial parties, the lack of a 
partisan element to the firm’s relationship means the contacts are of a company state 
type.  Finally, where close relationships do not last as long as a standard parliament, 
they are too ephemeral for business-government relations to be described as a party 
state.  Obviously, this definition is contestable.  It has been framed with the intention 
of restricting neither the company nor the party state to an excessively narrow 
domain.  At any rate, it is a much clearer guide to empirical research than Grant’s 
general formulation.  In the empirical sections of this article, this definition will be 
applied to contacts between individual firms and the state or political system.   
 
Now that the three types of business-government relations have been clearly 
distinguished, it is necessary to acknowledge that, just as there are important 
differences between different types of company and party state behaviour, there are 
many different phenomena that fall into the category of the association state.  The 
association state has been covered by the voluminous literature on interest groups.  
The dominant classification is still the distinction between pluralism and corporatism, 
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first made explicitly by Schmitter (1974).  According to Lijphart (1999, 172) in a 
pluralist system: 
(1) Membership of associations is voluntary. 
(2) Associations compete for members. 
(3) Associations are typically organisationally weak. 
(4) Associations pressure the political system from the outside, rather than participate from 
the inside. 
Corporatism is simply the opposite of pluralism for each of the four elements.   
 
EXPLAINING BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 
Neither Grant nor any other author attempts a general explanation for the relative 
importance of the three archetypes.  This article will apply five hypotheses, all of 
which are grounded in the existing literature on business-government relations.  The 
first two hypotheses seek to explain why some systems are association states and 
others are not.  The third hypothesis explains why some systems are company states, 
as opposed to party or association states.  The last two explanations distinguish the 
company and party states.      
 
The first explanation relates to labor union power.  In many systems, by far the 
most prominent type of business association has been the employer organisation.  
Historically, employer organisations tended to emerge as interlocutors to labor unions 
(Windmuller and Gladstone).    The second hypothesis is a development of a virtual 
axiom in public policy – Theodore Lowi’s argument that different types of politics 
will be associated with different types of policy.  A very general distinction between 
types of policy is that between public and private goods.  Collective action, as 
undertaken by associations, is much more likely to concentrate on the delivery of 
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public goods to member firms, than it is to specialise in delivering private policy 
goods.  A firm seeking a private good is likely to have to rely on its own resources 
(Crouch, 202).  Grant presents two lists of policies, one of which conduces to the 
company and one of which conduces to the association state (1993, 99).  The former 
is virtually a list of private goods, with the latter being virtually a list of public goods.  
Similarly, Graham Wilson’s emphasis on federal contracts seems like an excellent 
proxy for the importance of private policy goods to a firm (1990, 286-288).   
 
The two hypotheses outlined above explain the relative importance of the 
association state, but they do not distinguish between the company and party states.  
The third hypothesis links the importance of the company state to multinational or 
foreign ownership (Crouch, 196; Grant, 18).  Such companies have multinational 
interests, which cannot easily be represented by national business associations.  Their 
combination of size and mobility means that politicians are often amenable to contact 
on a company-by-company basis.  The company state exemplified by multinationals 
is that of the government-relations division and/or outside professional consultants, as 
opposed to the personal contacts of the managers or freelance lobbyists.  The need for 
transnational coordination, along with a lack of rootedness in the host society, make 
such informal options less attractive.  All of these considerations also mean that 
multinationals are relatively rarely found in party-state relationships.   
 
The fourth hypothesis is the influence of the party system itself (Grant, Martinelli, 
and Patterson, 78-82).   In many systems, the attitudes of political parties to contacts 
with firms vary.  For example, there are “parties of business” and “parties of labor”.  
The level of competition in a system also matters.  If there is a dominant political 
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party, it is very likely to develop close contacts with business.  If parties alternate in 
power, there is less incentive for firms to ally themselves with a particular party.  If 
there is an unstable system, in which parties appear, win power, and then disappear, 
commitment to a party seems foolhardy.  The party system is especially important 
with regard to the public sector.  State ownership provides a direct channel for the 
interpenetration of commercial and party political interests (Grant, Martinelli, and 
Patterson, 78).   
 
The fifth and final hypothesis examines the configuration of a system’s elite.  If 
the political and economic elites come from exclusive and similar backgrounds, and 
shift between, or combine, political and business positions, this facilitates the 
company state (Mills; Useem).  It is worth emphasising that arguments about common 
backgrounds necessarily involve exclusivity.  Essentially, if a small group defined by 
a common past experience represent a substantial proportion of the elite, background 
matters.   If those with different political backgrounds, whether occupying political or 
business positions, also occupy different social spheres, then the party state is 
encouraged (Kadushin). 
 
The hypotheses are summarised in Table 2 below.   
 
TABLE 2 
Explanations for classification of system of business-government relations 
Association State versus Others Company versus Party State 
1. Labor Union power 4. Party System 
2. Public versus private goods 5. Elite configuration 
3. Foreign Ownership 
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 POSTCOMMUNIST STUDIES 
No research has systematically asked what sort of system of business-government 
relations is emerging in a postcommunist country.  A normative debate has raged on 
the role of the state in the economy (Olson 2000; Shleifer and Vishny) and there is an 
increasing number of interesting empirical works on portions of the question, notably 
corporatism and corruption (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann; Padgett).  The Western 
comparitor is often vague or implicit in such studies, and therefore they do not 
directly address the hypothesis of the diversity of capitalist democracy.  In this 
section, it is argued that, in spite of some appearances to the contrary, the 
postcommunist literature does not add any new variables to the literature reviewed 
above.   
 
The vast majority of the literature focuses solely on the association state.  
Frequently, this literature finds associations to be weak but either completely ignores 
(Draus; Padgett), or does not systematically investigate, other types of business-
government relations.  One work does seem to mention the party state, but only 
extremely briefly, and not as part of a plausibly comprehensive classification of 
business-government relations (Ágh, 112).   
 
Some prominent authors promote ownership as a specifically postcommunist 
variable.  However, this is not an argument about a new variable, but rather about a 
different measurement of an old variable.  It is commonplace to assume that state 
ownership represents a different sort of business-government relations from relations 
between private firms and the state.  The postcommunist studies (Schoenman; 
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Staniszkis; Stark and Bruzst, 78) emphasise the existence and importance of the lack 
of a clear distinction between public and private ownership.  They demonstrate that 
the measurement of the ownership variable should be trichotomous rather then 
dichotomous.  This in no way means that mixed ownership cannot be analysed in 
terms of the association, company or party states, as Grant analysed state and private 
ownership in the Italian chemical industry. 
 
Another variable stressed by several studies is “networks” (Jasiecki; Staniszkis; 
Stark and Bruzst).  This is definitely an important correction to a literature, which 
often seems to assume that the association state is the only type of business-
government relations possible.  However, this emphasis begs the big question: what 
type of network?  Surely, one fundamental distinction is whether firms have their own 
networks, or are encapsulated by party political networks.  In other words, do these 
networks reflect the company or the party state?  When describing networks, some of 
the literature tends to use terms like “personal”, “political”, “party” and  “social” 
almost interchangeably.  Moreover, none of the literature explicitly links networks to 
a model of business-government relations.  This literature is most usefully interpreted 
as a version of the elite configuration hypothesis outlined above. 
 
The final putative postcommunist classification of business-government relations 
might be called politicisation.  Some works gather together the ownership and 
network variables with an emphasis on the manipulation of private policy goods by 
the state to argue for a distinctively postcommunist, or at least nonWestern, type of 
business-government relations (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann; Staniszkis).  This 
 11
emphasis on politicisation may not be present in the Western literature, but the 
components of this compound variable are indeed present.   
 
The postcommunist literature does not just compound variables that are 
considered separate in the Western literature, it also tends to elide the distinction 
between dependent and independent variables.  This elision may be explained by an 
awareness of two intellectual challenges.  Firstly, there is a concern for complex and 
reciprocal causality.  Secondly, there is an emphasis on the nature of the communist 
system as a master explanation for postcommunist outcomes (Eyal, Szelényi, and 
Townsley; Staniszkis; Stark and Bruzst), and a resulting reluctance to divide 
postcommunist variables into dependent and independent categories.  In both cases, 
the response is the same: concrete and rigorous analysis is the best way to unravel 
complex causality as it is the best way to construct a causal chain which upgrades the 
postcommunist master variable from an assertion to a testable theory. 
 
METHODS 
The aim of this article is not to produce a definitive classification of the Polish system 
of business-government relations, but merely to assess whether concepts developed to 
deal with Western contexts can deal with a postcommunist context like Poland.  It is 
unlikely that an application of Grant’s general classification could be achieved by any 
sort of evidence other than a synthesis of primary and secondary, quantitative and 
qualitative sources.  Indeed, this is the approach of Grant himself, and many other 
writers on business-government relations.   
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The two principal primary sources used in this article are sets of qualitative and 
quantitative interviews.  The author conducted thirty qualitative interviews between 
1999 and 2002.  The interviewees were nine politicians from across the political 
spectrum with a particular involvement in business issues, eleven business association 
executives from the principal peak organisations (Kozek, 86), three professional 
political consultants, and seven businesspeople who were prominent as among 
Poland’s richest and/or most politically active businesspeople.  The Institute of 
Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences carried out the quantitative 
interviews in 1998 (Wasilewski).1  A sample of 300 was drawn from the list of the 
500 biggest firms in Poland.  The response rate was 64.6 per cent.  Since two 
members of some firms were interviewed, where there were two respondents from 
one firm, one of them was randomly deleted.  This made for an N of 144. 
 
 
THE ASSOCIATION STATE 
 
This section will assess the role of business associations in Polish business-
government relations, and then go on to evaluate the labor union and policy-type 
hypotheses. 
 
The structure of Poland’s system of business associations is pluralist.  The 
influence of associations is too limited for Poland to be described as an association 
state.  One survey found that over 35 per cent of heads of firms claimed never to have 
heard of any organisation representing employers (Institute of Public Affairs, 7).  
Polish employer organisations have, on average, just one employee and are heavily 
dependent on membership fees and the contributions of volunteers to survive 
(Nalęcz).  These weak organisations are divided amongst themselves. There is only a 
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notional division of labour between the National Chamber of Commerce, lobbying 
organisations like the Business Centre Club or the Polish Business Roundtable, 
“artisan” associations, guilds, and employer organisations.  There have been various 
attempts to institutionalise co-ordination amongst all these groups.  At the moment 
this is being done by an organisation called “Leviathan”, but it speaks with virtually 
no independent authority.  Moreover, even within categories such as employer 
organisation there are competing peak organisations.  Peak associations organise a 
small minority of the relevant primary associations.  Just as the associations have a 
weak and divided presence amongst businesspeople they are rarely central actors in 
politics (Keat, 212).  Only 3.1 per cent of deputies in the Second Sejm (the Polish 
parliament of 1993-97) felt that employer organisations had a great influence on their 
work (Wesołowski and Post, 188).  The principal peak associations, and many 
sectoral associations, are frequently consulted by the government on new bills, but 
they have no right to be consulted and often do not hear about a bill until it is 
published.  There is a Tripartite Commission, but its only significant power is the 
setting of wages in the budget sector.  Union and political representatives, along with 
many business leaders, all concur that, in practice, negotiations are between unions 
and the state, which is, after all, the only employer in the budget sector  (Interviews: 
Bochniarz, Długosz, Gielgus,). In 2000, even representatives of the top business 
associations found it difficult to think of a recent policy success (Interviews: Kłoczko, 
Malinowski, Uchman). 
 
The weakness of labor unions is a powerful explanation for the weakness of 
employer and general business associations.  Union membership as a percentage of 
the labour force is currently about fourteen percent (Vaughan-Whitehead, 254) and 
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has declined sharply since the fall of communism (Kubicek, 86; Padgett, 78; 
Rzeczpospolita 2000).  Membership of Polish unions is high and stable in the state 
sector; is being eroded in privatised firms, and is virtually non-existent in new private 
and small enterprises (Gardawski, Gąciarz, Mokrzyszewski, and Panków, 14-15).    
When given a list of statements describing the role of unions workers most frequently 
chose, “They try but they do not achieve much” (Gardawski et al., 20).  
Unsurprisingly, then, conflict resolution services, which include dealing with unions, 
are a relatively unimportant incentive for joining business associations in Poland  (see 
Table 3 and Bąk, Kulawczuk, and Szcześniak).  The absence of labor unions 
drastically weakens the incentives for collective action at a local or sectoral level.   
While many businesspeople see a need for business-friendly national legislation, 
contributions to associations dedicated to this end, are obviously subject to free-riding 
problems (Olson 1971). 
 
TABLE 3 
Evaluation of services provided by Polish business associations 
Service Score 
Lobbying -1.46 
Conflict Resolution -0.8 
Domestic Market Information 1.3 
Foreign Market Information 0 
Accreditation and Reputation 0.28 
Government information 
 0.68 
Source: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey.  The raw data has been 
transformed in the following fashion.  Services which were not provided or provided no value 
to members were scored, 0; minor value, 1; moderate value, 2; major value, 3; and critical 
value, 4.  An overall mean was calculated for each activity in each country.  The scores for 
each service were then standardised in comparison with the scores for the other services in the 
same country.  This ensures that the figures measure the relative usefulness of different 
activities.   
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The importance of private goods tends to crowd out the relevance of public goods 
for Polish enterprises.  Between 1989 and 1996 the number of areas of business for 
which special licences was required increased from 11 to 21 (Kloc, 35).  In 2001, over 
50 per cent of the Ministry of Economy’s decrees related to individual firms 
(Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa 2001).  All of this state activity is reflected by the 
importance of the state to the fate of individual firms.  Table four shows how 
dependent Poland’s 300 largest firms have been on private policy goods. 
 
TABLE 4 
Private policy goods and large Polish enterprises 
Private Good Score (per cent) Missing (per cent) 
Financial assistance 25 4 
Special licence 24 4 
Sales to the state 52 12 
Majority of income from state 11 12 
Financial assistance, licence or sales to state 62 17 
Source: Institute of Political Studies survey data.   
 
This objective data is reflected in the perception of the managers of these firms (see 
Table 5).  Thirty per cent of Poland’s largest enterprises see state policy as more 
important to their firm than general economic conditions.  This is consistent with the 
importance of private policy goods to Polish firms. 
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 TABLE 5 
The most important factors in the business environment 
Factor Score (per cent) 
State policy 29 
Domestic economy 62 
World Economy 9 
Source: Institute of Political Studies survey data.  Missing 5 per cent. 
 
 
The implementation of the law can produce private goods from laws or 
regulations that are formally public goods.  The head of Poland’s Supreme Audit 
Chamber (NIK) writes: 
‘I can but I don’t have to’ – unfortunately, this principle operates in many fields of public 
administration.  Investigation after investigation by the Audit Chamber points to the lack of clear 
and transparent rules for taking decisions on matters such as the distribution of import quotas, 
licensing, tax breaks, and even qualification for flood aid.  Unequivocal conditions for 
entitlement to a quota or a benefit have not been specified.  Bureaucrats distribute subsidies to 
hospitals or coalmines, arbitrarily deciding which mine, or which hospital, should benefit, 
according to their own personal taste. (Rzeczpospolita 2000) 
 
Some of the more successful business associations are dedicated to the provision 
of private policy goods for their members (Interviews: Uchman, Mordasewicz, 
Stępniewski).  Nonetheless, for large firms, business associations play at most a minor 
supporting role.  Business associations do not have the resources to continually focus 
on specialised issues concerning individual members.  In most cases, they probably 
contribute a letter or a phone call.  It is only in causes célèbres that they can make a 
difference by calling on their media connections, and presenting individual disputes as 
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part of a pattern of government hostility to business.  Firms, which have made 
fortunes from private policy goods, concentrate on individual representation of their 
interests (Polityka 1998). 
 
THE COMPANY AND PARTY STATES 
This section will evaluate the foreign ownership, party system and elite configuration 
hypotheses, as all three of them aim to distinguish between the company and party 
states. 
 
Poland is no exception to the generalisation that foreign ownership encourages the 
company state.  Indirect forms of the company state are weak in Poland.  There are 
some examples of lawyers doubling as lobbyists or government-relations experts, 
Lejb Fogelman being a well-known Polish-American lawyer who fits into this 
category.   However, this phenomenon seems to be restricted to the foreign-owned 
sector and is even relatively marginal in that sector.  Employing a dedicated 
government-relations and/or public relations consultancy is a relatively common way 
for foreign enterprises to engage with Polish policy-makers (Interviews: Matraszek, 
Dubiński). As is the norm in many other countries, the consultancy firms are quite 
small businesses, often resulting from mergers or joint ventures, between Polish 
lobbyists and trans-national government-relations businesses.  Most senior 
businesspeople, have simply doubted that any outsider can manage their government-
relations better than they can themselves.  Since “lobbying” has much more negative 
connotations in Polish than it does in English, some Polish businesspeople have 
approached these firms seeking help with plans that were obviously illegal, or at least, 
highly unethical (Interview: Dziedzic).  In Poland, there is an important category of 
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freelance “lobbyists”.  Several have been centrally involved in corruption scandals 
(Majewski), while others are entirely legitimate.  They are often ex-politicians, 
politicians who have lost their parliamentary seats, or sitting parliamentarians whose 
party is out of government.  Until very recently, this sort of activity has been entirely 
unregulated.  It is difficult to gauge exactly how important this informal, and often 
shadowy, behaviour is.  However, all evidence suggests it is less important than the 
direct element of the company state, where companies manage their government 
relations themselves.   
 
The specialised government-relations division, which plays such an important role 
in the writings of Grant on Britain and Cathy-Jo Martin on America, is far from being 
a norm in Poland.  If it does exist, it is usually subsumed within a public relations or 
communications department, or more often is part of the chief executive’s office.  
However, its role is not that of high-status delegate of the chief executive or the 
board, but rather as a support to the personal management of government relations by 
the chief executive or another senior manager.   
 
Public ownership is frequently treated as a dichotomous variable.  In Poland, such 
a treatment can be seriously misleading.  In 2001 there were almost three times as 
many firms in which the state had partial ownership as there were wholly state-owned 
commercialised firms (Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa 2002, 78).  Almost 93 per cent 
of the state holdings were minority shares (Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa 2002, 83).  
In addition, foreign ownership and state ownership are quite often combined.  Twelve 
per cent of the firms in the Institute of Political Studies sample contained some state 
ownership and some foreign ownership.  In order to investigate, whether and how, 
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state ownership represents the company or the party state, it is necessary to move on 
to hypothesis four – the nature of the Polish party system.   
 
In Poland, positions on secularism and liberalism versus religion and 
traditionalism are much more strongly associated with the classification of parties as 
left, right and centre than economic policy (Szawiel).  For example, the left-wing 
party, the Social Democratic Alliance, insists on its social democratic nature, and is in 
some eyes (Lipsmeyer), but not in others (Bielasiak), associated with social 
democratic policies.  However, it is also regarded as a party of business, especially 
big business.  Since all substantial parties have tried to be parties of business, there is 
no natural party of business as there has been in many other political systems.  No 
government elected in a fully democratic election has been returned to government in 
the subsequent election.  In Poland, party competition has consisted of the alternation 
of center-right and peasant-left blocs.  This alternation seems set to continue with the 
next parliamentary election in 2005. 
 
Poland’s system of corporate governance is similar to the German one.  It has 
separate supervisory and executive boards.  All appointees to supervisory boards need 
to have passed the exam for members of supervisory boards.  In practice, most 
appointees are usually senior and well-qualified businesspeople, bureaucrats or 
academics.  Politicians regularly reject the suggestions of their bureaucrats and 
substitute politically loyal appointees (Schoenman).  There is considerable ambiguity 
about whether appointees are loyal simply to the individual who appointed them, to a 
faction of which the appointer is a member, or to a whole political party (Jarosz).  
However, it does seem that appointees are associated more strongly with loose cliques 
 20
rather than with parties as a whole.  For example, in the 1997 to 2001, it was a group 
of politicians from the Nowy Sącz area, rather than the right-wing Solidarity Electoral 
Action party, which dominated appointments to state-owned firms (Wprost 2000).  In 
the subsequent, left-wing government, appointments tended to reflect factional 
struggles between the prime minister, president, and State Treasury minister Wiesław 
Kaczmarek (Rzeczpospolita 2002).  Effectively, the membership of supervisory 
boards changes after elections, and frequently also reflects the high turnover of 
ministers of the state treasury.  Thus, where state ownership is present, business-
government relations tend to be characterized by the party state.   
 
Finally, there is the hypothesized influence of elite configuration on business-
government relations.  There is an intense level of contact between the political and 
economic elites and many businesspeople know senior politicians well.  In the 
Institute of Political Studies survey, members of the business elite were asked how 
well they knew politicians from a list of the twenty-two most influential in the state.  
They could answer that they had never met them, had had contact with them, that they 
knew them or that they knew them very well.  The average respondent had had 
contact with eight of the twenty-two, knew three of them very well or something in 
between. 
 
Educational institutions are frequently identified as a source and identifier of elite 
membership.  Polish educational institutions are too large and/or provide too small a 
proportion of both the business and political elites to explain why the direct 
involvement of senior managers is such an important type of business-government 
relations (see Table 6).  The most elite institution is the Warsaw School of 
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Economics.  Exclusive clubs have been another way of establishing and maintaining 
contact between different types of elites.  In spite of the efforts of some entrepreneurs, 
no equivalents of traditional British, or even American, clubs exist.  The most direct 
type of integration between the two elites, is when individuals’ careers shuttle 
between the business and the political spheres.  In Poland, it is relatively rare for 
members of the business elite to run for office.  Andrzej Olechowski, the runner-up in 
the presidential election of 2000, is the exception rather than the rule.  However, it is 
very common for politicians to be involved in business, especially when out of 
government, and, indeed out of parliament, as has often happened to prominent 
centrist and right-wing politicians.  These politicians do not generally find themselves 
in crucial positions in the largest enterprises.  Some maintain an elite position in 
business-government relations, rather than business or politics, by developing a 
freelance business-government relations consultancy.   
 
TABLE 6 












Warsaw 30.1 14.3 7.2 49,000 
Warsaw School of 
Economics 1.3 13.3 14.9 13,000 
Warsaw Technical 
University 3 13.3 5.2 30,000 
Jagiellonian 
University 3 5.6 0.5 29,000 
Sources: (Wasilewski and Pawlak, 54); www.uw.edu.pl; www.sgh.edu.pl; www.pw.edu.pl; 
www.uj.edu.pl 
 
Some argue that Polish business is divided into camps affiliated to particular 
political parties (Frentzel-Zagórska, 225), but the extent of this phenomenon is 
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probably exaggerated.  One supposed indicator of this camp structure is the 
prevalence of former members of the communist party in the business and political 
elites.  However, membership of the communist party was quite the opposite of an 
exclusive category, and it is not as reliable an indicator of political affiliation as might 
be imagined.  Many of the leaders of Poland’s anti-communist opposition were once 
members of the party.  The only institution, which seems like a plausible candidate as 
a common incubator for the business and political elites is the Warsaw School of 
Economics.  Its graduates have included prominent politicians from both the leftist 
and centrist blocs.   
 
It is difficult to judge the extent to which divisions of the Polish party system 
extend into the economic elite.  In the Polish media, there is a lot of discussion of 
networks formed under the previous regime, which have been adapted as a form of 
business-government relations in the present.  Again, it is possible to point to some 
networks, which have played a role in some scandals and there are some 
businesspeople that are undoubtedly identified with particular political parties.  On the 
other hand, there is substantial evidence that businesspeople are not associated with 
particular political parties (McMenamin).  So, for example, Jan Kulczyk, Poland’s 
richest man had a good relationship with the right-wing Solidarity Electoral Action 
but is also very close to the left-wing president Aleksander Kwaśniewski.  Similarly, 
Zygmunt Solorz of Polsat has worked hard to maintain a plethora of contacts with all 
relevant political parties.   
 
The lack of a narrow elite channel or channels suggests that Poland’s elite 
configuration does not explain the choice of the direct over the indirect elements of 
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the company state.  However, the lack of a party political cleavage in the economic 
elite does explain why direct contacts between private sector managers and the state 
represent the company, rather than the party, state.   
 
There is a substantial consensus that the two-most important types of contacts 
between government and business, are state ownership, and, in the private sector, the 
personal connections of senior personnel.   Table seven summarises the analysis of the 
company and party states in Poland.  Although, Polish business associations are of 
some importance, overall, Poland is a mixture of the company and party states.  All of 
the Western hypotheses are useful in explaining the relative marginalisation of 
associations and the particular Polish mixture of party and company states.   
 
TABLE 7 
Contacts Between Individual Firms and the State and Politics 
 Importance Classification 
Law Firms Marginal Company State 
Government-relations Consultants Moderate Company State 
Freelance Lobbyists Moderate Party State 
Government-Relations Divisions Moderate Company State 
State Ownership Substantial Party State 




The postcommunist literature on business-government relations does not make a 
convincing case for the introduction of new concepts that are not already to be found 
in the Western literature.  Moreover, the Western literature on business-government 
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relations “travels” well to Poland.  The confrontation between Grant’s classification 
and the Polish context has not lead to “conceptual stretching …, i.e., to vague 
amorphous conceptualisations” (Sartori, 1034).  On the contrary, travelling to Poland 
has produced a much more concrete and rigorous distinction between the company 
and party states, and one that should be applicable to other capitalist democracies.  
Similarly, the explanatory hypotheses are all meaningful in the Polish context, and 
some such as public ownership, also have to be defined more, rather than less, 
rigorously to deal with the realities of Polish business-government relations.  This is 
not to say that Polish-business government relations are not unique, nor is to assert 
that an in-depth knowledge of the details and particularities of the Polish case are 
unnecessary.  It is simply being argued that understanding the unique and complicated 
Polish case does not necessitate the invention of any new concepts or hypotheses. 
 
If it were possible to present an equation to sum up business-government relations 
in capitalist democracies, the equations for Western and East-Central European states 
would contain the same dependent variable, the same independent variables and the 
same signs on all the coefficients.  The values of the coefficients would be different as 
would the values of the variables in the dataset.  This is not to deny that the “past is 
the most influential decision-maker” in East-Central European cases (Hayward).  So 
this article does not disagree with Stark and Bruzst (1998, 83) when they say, 
“Structural innovations that will bring about dynamic transformations are more likely 
to entail complex reconfigurations of institutional elements rather than their 
immediate replacement.”  However, it is being argued that the reconfiguration has 
resulted in a system that is describable and analysable using concepts developed in the 
West and for the West.  Of course, the past the master explanation for the values of 
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the variables, but the past has not thrown up any new variables that are unfamiliar to 
students of Western business-government relations, nor has it changed the sign on any 
of these familiar variables.  In this sense, then, Polish business-government relations 
are neoWestern.  Poland’s experience of communism is essential for an understanding 
of contemporary Polish business-government relations, but communism has not 










                                                 
1 I am grateful to Jacek Wasilewski for permission to use this data. The data was collected with funding 
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